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Abstract 
Individual attitudes towards multinational enterprises (MNEs) remains relatively 
understudied compared to individual attitudes towards other dimensions of globalization, 
particularly trade and immigration. In order to illuminate individual attitudes towards 
MNEs, this paper utilizes a large cross-country dataset (2003 International Social Survey 
Program) to examine individual perspectives on the impact of MNEs on local businesses.  
The paper draws on literature that studies the economic impacts of MNEs on local 
businesses, such as the transfer of technology from foreign affiliates to local businesses.  
Based on this literature the paper tests hypotheses to analyze how individuals’ skill-level 
(reflected in their educational attainment and occupational group) and the sector in which 
they work affects their perceptions of MNEs’ impact on local businesses.  Conforming to 
expectations from the literature, the paper finds that highly skilled individuals who are 
senior-level managers, legislators, and officials are less likely to think MNEs are damaging 
local businesses.  Also, private sector employees are less likely than public sector 
employees to see MNEs’ impact on local businesses as negative.  The paper also finds 
variation in these attitudes across developed countries, developing countries, and formerly 
communist states in Central and Eastern Europe.  In order to explore non-economic 
determinants of individual attitudes towards MNEs, the paper additionally explores how 
feelings of nationalism, confidence in democracy, and attitudes towards international affairs 
affect individual perspectives on MNEs.  The paper additionally shows that retired citizens’ 
previous sector of employment and occupation influences their perception of the MNEs’ 
impact on local businesses and that type of FDI (M&A versus Greenfield investment) 
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Introduction 
The rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) across the world has been a spectacular element of 
the contemporary episode of globalization. Production from foreign affiliates of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), the most prominent agents of FDI, reached over 10 percent of world output 
in 2000, compared to 5 percent in 1985.
1 Once the purview of highly developed countries, FDI 
now also encompasses emerging and developing markets, as countries across the world have 
opened their borders to international investment.  In 1998, inward FDI stocks in these countries 
constituted 9.5 per cent of the gross fixed capital formation in 2002 compared to 4.6 per cent 
(annual average) in 1988-1993.
2  The significance of FDI has expectedly ignited a scholarly 
debate on FDI and MNEs.
3  For instance, political scientists have explored how regime type 
(democratic versus non-democratic regimes) affects FDI flows
4, and scrutinized governance 
issues regarding MNEs, particularly accountability and transparency.
5  Additionally, various 
disciplines have emphasized concerns for MNEs’ impact on labour and environmental 
standards.
6  Economists have focused largely on examining how the determinants of FDI vary 
between horizontal and vertical forms of FDI, and how FDI affects national economies, 
including the extent to which FDI spurs growth and development.  They have also produced a 
rich literature on whether there are productivity spillovers from foreign affiliates of MNEs to 
local firms.
7 Given that our concern in this paper is assessing individual attitudes towards the 
impact of MNEs on local businesses, the economic literature on spillovers is core to our 
investigation.  Specifically, we analyze individual (public) attitudes towards the impact of MNEs 
on local businesses based on international survey data from the 2003 International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP).   
                                                            
1 Lipsey 2002. 
2 World Investment Report 2000, 2005.  The data used in this paper was collected in 2002, so we quote data from 
the vicinity of that year.  More recent data from 2006 for developing countries indicates that inward FDI flows 
constitute 13.8% of gross fixed capital formation, and inward FDI stocks constitute 26.7% of gross domestic product 
(World Investment Report 2007). 
3 Debates concerning MNE activities and its local impact are wide ranging. Activists and NGOs have also voiced 
critical opinions of multinational enterprises, emphasizing the power of the purse of the enterprises in wielding 
excessive influence over key decision-makers (Hertz 2001; Monbiot 2001) as well as the putatively subverting 
influence of brands on consumers (Klein 2002).  For a good critical assessment of this debate see Wolf 2005, 
Chapter 11. 
4 See, for instance, Li and Resnick 2003; and Jensen 2003. 
5 See, for instance, Koenig-Archibugi 2005; and Ruggie 2003. 
6 See Meyer 2008 for a review. 
7 See Alfaro et al. 2004 for a review.     3
In this paper, we examine how individuals’ skill-level (reflected in their educational 
attainment and occupational group) and the sector in which they work affects their perceptions of 
MNEs’ impact on local businesses.  We highlight a number of key mechanisms through which 
MNEs could affect individuals.  First, MNEs tend to pay a wage premium since they have higher 
productivity.
8  The wage premium argument suggests that individuals working for MNEs have a 
direct stake in an MNE presence in the local economy.  Conversely, such a direct stake does not 
exist for individuals who do not work for MNEs.  Second, MNEs can drive up the demand for 
skilled workers through productivity spillovers from foreign affiliates of MNEs to local firms.
9 
Since MNEs are regarded as possessing relatively better technology and are assumed to transfer 
this knowledge asset to their foreign affiliates, the question is whether these foreign affiliates 
transfer any of their knowledge to domestic firms in their host economy.
10  Below, we detail a 
number of mechanisms that facilitate these spillovers.  Third, MNEs can impact local firms 
negatively.  For example, MNEs can drive demand away from the products of local firms, 
potentially causing negative individual perceptions.
11  In this paper, we consider these diverse set 
of factors in differentiating between individuals who are more likely be directly economically 
affected by MNEs and those that are likely to be relatively more insulated from these effects.   
  Besides the empirical question of how foreign affiliates of MNEs affect local businesses, 
there is also the question of what individuals perceive to be the impact of MNEs on their 
economy.  These individual perceptions may be objective assessments of the impact of MNEs on 
local businesses, or individuals’ economic standing in particular, given individuals’ skill-level as 
well as sector/type of occupation.  Yet, such perceptions may also stem from pro-outsider, pro-
openness inclinations formed through education, particularly higher education, and occupational 
environment.
12  Individuals’ confidence in the working of domestic institutions, such as 
democracy, could also be an important determinant of perceptions of MNEs, as trust in the 
working of domestic institutions affects one’s political outlook in general.
13  Alternatively, these 
perceptions may constitute largely emotive responses, stemming, for example, from nationalistic 
                                                            
8 See Driffold and Taylor 2000 for a review. 
9 Slaughter 2002. 
10 Haskel et al 2004.  This spillover could also occur through patents licensed by MNEs to local firms (Slaughter 
2002).   
11 See, for instance, Aitken and Harrison 1999. 
12 Hainmueller and Hiscox  2006. 
13 See Strokes 1962; Citrin 1974; Hetherington 1998 on “political trust”.  We elaborate this point later.   4
sentiments to the presence of MNEs.  In this paper, we also explore these various non-economic 
determinants of individual attitudes towards MNEs.   
  Analyzing individual (public) attitudes towards MNEs is important because 
governmental responses and policies towards facets of globalization are informed and 
constrained by these individual attitudes.
14  Furthermore, since the study of individual attitudes 
also reveals which groups of individuals are less prone to think positively of MNEs, it helps 
identify, beyond those that are well-organized and vocal, the reluctant groups that need to be 
appeased for further commitments to openness to investment.  In general, MNEs and hence FDI 
raise so much public concern that they have been associated widely with the undesirables of 
globalization.
15  Yet despite the seeming importance of individual attitudes towards MNEs, 
research to date has had little to say about the determinants of individual attitudes towards 
MNEs.
16  The focus has instead mostly been on other aspects of globalization, particularly trade 
and immigration.
17  It is this gap this paper aims to fill.   
   The paper finds, as the economic literature anticipates, that highly skilled individuals are 
less likely than other occupational groups to think that MNEs are negatively impacting local 
businesses. We also find private sector employees are less likely than public sector employees to 
think MNEs have a negative impact. We also show that retired citizens’ previous sector of 
employment and occupation influences their perception of the MNEs’ impact on local 
businesses.  This finding implies that behaviours and attitudes acquired during labour market 
activity, as opposed to individual calculations of labour market benefits, influence individuals’ 
perceptions.  In addition, the paper demonstrates that individual attitudes differ across developed 
and emerging markets, which are differentiated into developing country emerging markets and 
Central and Eastern Europe Countries (CEECs).
18  We also provide evidence that the form of 
FDI, whether by mergers and acquisitions (M&A) or Greenfield (setting up of new plants) 
investment, has different influences on individuals in the three clusters of countries analysed. 
                                                            
14 Scheve and Slaughter 2008. 
15 Gorg and Greenaway 2004, 171; and Deardorff 2003. 
16 A notable exception is Scheve and Slaughter 2004, which examines the impact of FDI on worker’s attitudes of 
labor-market insecurity. The authors show that, in the UK at least, FDI has the effect of raising individual’s 
perception of economic insecurity. Given the novel nature of Scheve and Slaughter’s work, it is difficult to evaluate 
the extent to which economic insecurity applies universally. 
17 Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006, 2007 (on trade and immigration, respectively); Mayda and Rodrik 2005 (on trade); 
Daniels and Von der Ruhr 2003 (on immigration); and Scheve and Slaughter 2001a (on trade). 
18 As we will argue, this differentiation between different types of economies is necessary.   5
Moreover, the paper finds that confidence in domestic institutions as well as the inclination 
towards governance through multilateral institutions influence individual attitudes towards 
MNEs, as does patriotism and nationalism.  Overall, the paper is the first to analyze what 
attributes of individuals are more (less) likely to be supportive (or not) of MNEs, which has 
broader implications for different stakeholders, be they civil society organizations, governments, 
or MNEs.   
   
The Impact of MNEs on Local Businesses and Individuals: Scenarios 
In this section, we aim to highlight a number of key labor market considerations that can affect 
individuals’ perceptions of how MNEs impact local businesses.  We argue that MNEs can affect 
individuals on a direct or indirect basis.  A direct effect occurs when an MNE hires an individual.  
For indirect, we examine how MNEs can affect local businesses and, via these businesses, 
individuals.  Specifically, we examine potential consequences of productivity spillovers from 
foreign affiliates of MNEs to local businesses.  Under direct and indirect considerations, we 
consider both potential positive and negative impacts of MNEs.  Our hypotheses in the following 
subsection build on the following assumption:  individuals who stand to gain economically from 
the presence of MNEs will consider the impact of MNEs on local businesses relatively 
positively.  
 
Economic Determinants:  Direct Effects  – the Wage Premium 
A direct potential benefit accrued to individuals from MNEs is the wage premium paid by MNEs 
to their employees, even after controlling for firm characteristics and other variables that can 
affect the wage level.
19 The wage premium exists because MNEs possess relatively better 
technology compared to local firms and hence higher productivity.  It can also be understood as 
side-payments to minimize worker turnover and prevent worker-employer disputes.
20 Recent 
studies have explored the contingencies associated with the wage premium.  For instance, Gorg, 
Strobl, and Walsh find no statistically significant difference between the starting wages paid by 
foreign and domestic firms, although they find a wage premium for workers that receive on-the-
                                                            
19 Various studies show that there is a wage premium paid by foreign firms.  For detailed literature reviews on the 
wage premium, see Heyman et al 2007, Gorg and Greenaway 2004, and Haddad and Harrison 1993. 
20 See Girma and Gorg 2007, 100; and Scheve and Slaughter 2004, 665 for reviews.   6
job training.
21  Their results show that the higher the degree of foreign ownership, the greater the 
earnings of workers with such training, when controlling for firm and individual characteristics 
(such as the size of the firm and human capital).  Furthermore, Gorg and Strobl argue that 
multinationals employ workers with a longer time horizon and therefore invest more in the 
development of human capital through training relative to local firms, suggesting the presence of 
a wage premium even if starting wage levels may be the same.
22  Given the existence of a wage 
premium paid by MNEs,  ideally, we would test the following hypothesis:  Employees working 
for MNEs will tend to assess the impact of MNEs on local businesses relatively more positively 
than employees not working for MNEs. 
  Yet, our dataset, which will be outlined in the upcoming section, does not allow us to 
pinpoint employees who work for MNEs.  Nevertheless, the dataset allows us to determine 
which individuals do not work for MNEs – those who are employed in the public sector.  These 
individuals do not stand to make any direct personal gain from the presence of MNEs, and 
therefore should be indifferent towards the presence of MNEs within the confines of the direct 
labor-market gain argument.  While the data also indicates another group of non-MNE 
employees—the self-employed—, as we will discuss below, these individuals are likely to be 
affected by the presence of MNEs.  Given this data constraint, our first hypothesis is: 
 
H1:  Employees working for the public sector will be less inclined than others to consider the 
impact of MNEs on local businesses as positive, as these employees do not derive any direct 
benefits from the MNE presence in the local economy. 
 
Economic Determinants:  Indirect Effects – Productivity Spillovers 
Positive indirect effects.  A substantial part of the economic literature on MNEs focuses on 
potential spillovers from MNEs to local businesses.  These productivity gains from foreign to 
domestic firms can occur through a number of channels.
23  First, there can be “imitation” or 
“demonstration” effects, which means domestic firms can learn through observing the advanced 
production and management techniques of foreign affiliates of MNEs.
24  Second, productivity 
                                                            
21 Gorg, Strobl and Walsh 2007. 
22 Gorg and Strobl 2002. 
23 We outline the major channels here, and do not aim to provide an exhaustive list. 
24 Meyer and Sinani 2009; and Gorg and Greenaway 2004.   7
spillovers can occur when foreign affiliates of MNEs contribute to skill advancement in the host 
countries.  The mobility of workers trained by MNEs allows for the dissemination of the human 
capital from the foreign affiliate to the rest of the economy.
25  For instance, surveys of MNEs, 
such as those conducted by the World Bank in Czech Republic and Latvia in 2003, confirm the 
presence of the demonstration effect as well as labour mobility.
26  Third, foreign affiliates can 
spur competition, thereby facilitating technology diffusion and hence productivity spillovers.
27  
Fourth, MNEs can share their knowledge of trade channels with domestic firms or raise the 
profile of the country as an exporter, again generating knowledge spillovers.
28  Finally, there can 
be vertical spillovers from MNEs to domestic firms.  Vertical spillovers can occur in a number of 
manners:  MNEs can assist the domestic firms in their efforts to improve productivity; domestic 
firms can enhance efforts for greater productivity on their own; or the productivity increase can 
happen when domestic firms are doing business with the MNE.
29  While vertical spillovers 
generally point to inter-industry spillovers, firms within the same industry can also benefit from 
these vertical linkages.
30  The implication of the literature on spillovers for this paper is that 
MNEs increase the demand for high-skilled workers, since the presence of new technologies 
raises the potential for domestic firms to demand more skilled labor.
31 Well-educated individuals 
as well as those working in occupations that demand high skills are thus the likely candidates to 
benefit more from the presence of MNEs.  Hence our second hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H2:  Relatively high-skilled individuals will tend to find the impact of MNEs on local businesses 
to be relatively positive. 
 
This hypothesis, however, is not the only plausible scenario suggested by the above 
discussion on spillovers.  That discussion also suggests that we should expect to see a difference 
between private and public sector employees.  Individuals working in the private sector or those 
who are self-employed could be observing the spillovers from MNEs to local businesses or could 
                                                            
25 Meyer and Sinani 2009. 
26 Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005. 
27 Haddad and Harrison 1993; and Gorg and Strobl 2001, F723. 
28 Meyer and Sinani 2009. 
29 Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005, 48. See also:  Gorg and Greenaway 2004, 182; and Javorcik 2004, 608. 
30 Meyer and Sinani 2009. 
31 Slaughter 2002.   8
have first-hand experience of them (for instance, if the individual works for or owns a firm in 
direct contact with the MNE or one that “imitates” the MNE).  In general, private sector 
employees and the self-employed are not insulated from the effects of MNEs, meaning 
individuals in these sectors stand to gain and, as discussed below, lose the most from the 
presence of MNEs.  In contrast, public sector employees are likely to be insulated from the 
influences of MNEs.   
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) pose an interesting question.  On the one hand, SOEs 
could function more like private sector enterprises, benefiting from the various spillovers from 
MNEs.  In this scenario, employees of SOEs could be inclined to think positively about the 
impact of MNEs on local businesses.  On the other hand, there is also the possibility that 
(employees of) state-owned enterprises see themselves in competition with MNEs, which attract 
labor away from SOEs.  For instance, Wu discusses how skills of workers (and hence 
competitiveness) in SOEs decline, as FDI increases employment opportunities for high 
productivity individuals in the non-state sector.
32  In this scenario, those individuals left behind at 
SOEs are likely to look unfavourably upon the impact of MNEs on local businesses. 
Economic Determinants:  Negative indirect effects. There could be negative (or lack of) 
spillovers from MNEs to local businesses in general.  In their study of Venezuelan 
manufacturing plants, Aitken and Harrison find that in small manufacturing plants (less than 50 
employees) foreign ownership and productivity increases are positively correlated, but wholly 
domestically owned firms experience profitability losses with an increasing MNE presence.  As 
the authors explain, MNEs can push down the productivity of local firms by attracting demand 
away from the products of these firms and forcing these firms to disperse fixed costs over a 
smaller market.
33 Haddad and Harrison, in the study of the manufacturing sector in Morocco, 
argue that foreign (MNE) presence reduces the productivity dispersion within the sector, but they 
do not find evidence that such presence increases productivity growth for domestic firms.
34  
Konings finds no spillovers, or negative spillovers in Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland.
35  For 
Romania and Bulgaria, he attributes the lack of positive spillovers to the competition effect, as 
                                                            
32 Wu 2003. 
33 Aitken and Harrison 1999, 607. 
34 Haddad and Harrison 1993. 
35 Konings 2001.   9
identified by Aitken and Harrison.
36  Furthermore, MNEs can attract domestic capital and labor 
away from local firms.
37  In short, the private and self-employed individuals who stand to gain 
from MNEs also stand to lose from their presence.  Their attitudes towards MNEs’ impact on 
local businesses, then, depends on whether they are benefiting as customers, suppliers, or 
“imitators” from MNE presence, or whether they are being adversely affected by the competition 
MNEs create.  Hence another hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3:  Perceptions of individuals working in the private sector and perceptions of self-employed 
individuals  towards MNEs’ impact on local businesses is unclear (given that they stand to both 
gain and lose from the presence of MNEs). 
 
Furthermore, the presence of spillovers differs across countries with different levels of 
development, even though the literature does not precisely highlight exact patterns of difference 
across countries.  Some studies demonstrate horizontal (intra-industry) spillovers in developed 
countries, 
38 while others find negative horizontal spillovers from MNEs to local firms in 
developing and CEEC economies.
39  Yet, studies also show both horizontal and vertical (inter-
industry) spillovers in developing and CEEC markets.  Blomstrom and Wolff’s study on Mexico 
is an example, even though the authors concede that they are not able to distinguish whether they 
observe productivity growth in local firms due to horizontal spillovers from MNEs or because 
MNEs push uncompetitive firms out of the market.
40  Another study that finds positive spillovers 
is Blomstrom and Sjoholm’s study of the Indonesian manufacturing sector.
41  Studies on inter-
industry spillovers, which differentiate between horizontal, backward, and forward linkages in 
the supply chain, find evidence for inter-industry spillovers in both developing countries (in 
Colombia by Kugler and in Indonesia by Blalock and Gertler) and in CEECs (in Lithuania by 
                                                            
36 Aitken and Harrison 1999. 
37 Meyer 2004. 
38 For evidence of such positive spillovers, see e.g., Keller and Yeaple 2003 for the US manufacturing sector; Haskel 
et al 2002 and Liu et al 2000 for the UK manufacturing sector; Caves 1974 for the Australian manufacturing sector; 
Globerman 1979 for the Canadian manufacturing sector.   
39 Gorg and Greenaway 2004, 178-9. Damijan et al 2003 find no positive horizontal spillovers from foreign-owned 
firms to their domestic counterparts in a study of eight CEECs, with the exception of Romania.  This study covers 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
40 Blomstrom and Wolff 1989. 
41 Blomstrom and Sjoholm 1999.   10
Javorcik).
42 This literature also suggests that the more embedded the MNEs in their host country 
economies, the greater the spillovers may be, as MNEs are likely to be involved in training 
locals, engaging with local suppliers, and setting up production facilities.
43  FDI through mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) rather than Greenfield investments tends to be associated with greater 
domestic involvement of firms, since the domestic firms involved in the merger tend to have 
established links to local suppliers.
44  In short, outside of the developed world, there is little 
evidence of intra-industry spillovers from MNEs benefiting domestic plants/firms, while there is 
some evidence that vertical spillovers from MNEs to domestic firms may be important.
45  Given 
the differences regarding the impact of MNEs on local businesses, the hypothesis drawn from 
these discussions is as follows: 
 
H4:  Individual attitudes towards the impact of MNEs on local businesses differ across countries 
with varying levels of development.
  
 
The equivocal results from the literature preclude the formulation of a more precise hypothesis.  
Furthermore, the aforementioned literature on vertical spillovers suggests that M&A versus 
Greenfield may be affecting the local businesses differently – we return to this issue in our 
empirical analysis.
46  However, labor market considerations, analyzed in this sub-section, likely 
to constitute only a part of the story 
 
                                                            
42 Kugler 2001; Blalock and Gertler 2003; and Javorcik 2004. 
43 See Beugelsdijk et al 2008, 6 for a review. 
44 Javorcik 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005; and Blomstrom and Sjoholm 1999, 917 
45 How domestic firms in developed versus developing countries fare in the presence of international business 
depends on other factors, including domestic credit constraints.  For instance, Harrison and Macmillan find, based 
on data in the Ivory Coast, that “foreign enterprises crowd out domestic enterprises in the local credit markets” 
(2003, 98). Blonigen and Wang 2004 find FDI to be more likely to crowd out domestic investment in developed 
than less-developed countries.  Also, productivity spillovers may have to do with the technology gap between the 
foreign and domestic firms, suggesting further differences between developed and developing countries.  Findlay’s 
seminal work (1978) shows that the higher this technology gap the greater the observed spillover may be, as the 
relatively backward host economy is replete with opportunities for technological change and the pressure to change 
is all the more higher (Gorg and Greenaway 2004, 175).  Yet, for this spillover to occur the technology gap between 
the foreign and local enterprises cannot be too wide, as in order for the technology transfer to take place the host 
economy has to have the ability to absorb, such as adequate human capital and sufficient infrastructure (Glass and 
Saggi 1998 in Gorg and Greenaway 2004, 175).    
46 While it is not implausible that individuals also consider the effect of MNEs on the economy as a whole in 
forming their opinions on whether MNEs are affecting local businesses adversely, given the specific nature of the 
question, considerations about direct and indirect labor market impact of MNEs on individuals seem more pertinent 
than considerations about the economy as a whole, such as MNEs boosting the country’s investment level.   11
Non-economic considerations in attitudes towards MNEs 
As discussed in the Introduction, individuals’ perceptions of whether MNEs hurt local businesses 
may have to do with non-economic, non-labor market, factors.  This finding would be 
unsurprising as both the public and the scholarly debates over MNEs are concerned with the role 
of MNEs in the greater social fabric of their host economies.  MNEs have been associated with 
many of the “bads” of globalization and have been at the heart of some of the most contentious 
debates on globalization.
47  Consider, for example, the inclusion of the trade related aspects of 
intellectual property rights within the framework of the WTO thanks to intense lobbying by 
pharmaceutical companies from Western economies.  Many spectators view the inclusion of 
intellectual property rights over medicine as putting profits over the health of people with 
infectious disease in developing countries.
48 In general, globalization has often been associated 
with a revolution by MNEs, trumpeting state autonomy and bypassing public interests.
49  MNEs 
have also been recipients of public outrage against sweatshops, environmental degradation, and 
tax havens.  Even though corporate social responsibility has become an increasingly popular 
mantra, the actual social contribution of MNEs continues to be disputed.
50 Given the putative 
notoriety of MNEs, attitudes towards MNEs can reasonably be expected to hold a strong non-
economic dimension in the eyes of the public. 
In order to examine the impact of non-economic factors on individual attitudes towards 
MNEs, we examine a number of variables.  First, feelings of patriotism or nationalism could 
determine individual propensity to be friendly towards MNEs.  Studies of individual attitudes 
towards dimensions of globalization, trade and immigration, show that nationalist tendencies are 
associated with protectionist or anti-immigration attitudes.
51  Similarly, nationalist tendencies are 
likely to be associated with decreased propensity for positive evaluations of MNEs’ impact on 
local businesses.  Therefore: 
 
H5:  Nationalist individuals are more likely to think MNEs are harming local businesses. 
                                                            
47 On these points, see Deardorff 2003. 
48 See Stiglitz 2006, Chapter 4. For a discussion of how the negative effects of MNEs are exaggerated see Wolf 
2005, Chapter 11.   
49 Hertz 2001; and Monbiot 2001. 
50 The Economist 2008. 
51 See, for instance, see Mayda and Rodrik 2002 and O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001.   12
Second, individuals’ confidence in the workings of domestic institutions, a sign of 
“political trust”, could also determine attitudes towards MNEs, increasing the inclination towards 
a benign assessment of MNEs’ impact on local businesses.
52 “Political trust” has been 
understood in a narrow sense as confidence in the government
53 as well as in a broader sense as 
confidence in constitutive branches of the domestic governance system.
54  A number of different 
variables could help infer about political trust.  For instance, if individuals have some degree of 
confidence in the way in which democracy works, they will have confidence in their ability to 
affect political developments, including governmental policies towards openness to investment 
and the presence of MNEs.  Hence confidence in democracy is likely to increase individuals’ 
propensity to think MNEs are not harming local businesses.  Given the data we utilize, we will 
examine individuals’ trust in the way in which democracy works as a proxy for political trust. 
 
H6:  Individuals with “political trust” are more likely to think that MNEs are not 
harming local businesses.   
 
Individuals’ perspectives on international affairs could also affect their assessment of 
whether MNEs are negatively impacting local businesses.  Specifically, we contend that 
individuals who are more prone to value cooperative arrangements with other nation-states are 
more likely to be favorable towards the impact of MNEs.  For instance, individuals who favor 
governance through international institutions can be identified as holding pro-cooperation and 
pro-outsider (i.e. towards international organizations as well as other states) views.  Conversely, 
individuals who think the national interest, however defined, should remain above all other 
considerations are likely to be (at best) sceptical of the potential intrusiveness of “foreign” 
institutions.  Considering that MNEs are one of the key international institutions driving 
globalization, individual attitudes that gauge individuals’ willingness for cooperative 
international arrangements can potentially illuminate about individual perceptions of the MNEs’ 
impact on local businesses. In short: 
 
                                                            
52 Citrin 1974. 
53 Strokes 1962. 
54 Strokes 1962; and Hetherington 1998.   13
H7:  Individuals that look favorably upon cooperation with international institutions are 
more likely to think that MNEs are not harming local businesses.   
 
Having laid out various economic and non-economic factors that could determine 
individual attitudes towards MNE impact on local businesses, we now turn to the empirical 
analysis.   
 
The Empirical Analysis  
The data used in this study are taken from the 2003 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 
dataset and are derived from individual responses to the following statement: “Large 
international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses.”  From responses 
to this question, we construct the binary dependent variable, labelled as pro-MNE, which is 
coded 1 where individual’s ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’ with the statement, and 0 for those 
who ‘agree’, ‘agree strongly’, or ‘neither agree or disagree’.
55 The dataset includes responses 
from 41,160 individuals from three groups of countries:  a) developed countries—the United 
States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Israel and thirteen European countries; b) eight 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)—Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia; c)  small, heterogeneous set of emerging 
economies from the developing world—South Korea, the Philippines, Chile, and South Africa.
56  
While individual perceptions need not be fully aligned with actual impacts of MNEs on local 
businesses, the literature surveyed above suggests that we need to examine the extent to which 
MNE activity differs across countries with different levels of economic development.  Therefore, 
as Table 1 shows, we analyze the data in three different sub-samples formed by grouping 
countries with similar economic development: developed, CEECs, and other emerging markets. 
 
                                                            
55 Information on the dataset can be found at http://www.issp.org/. ISSP datasets have been used in a number of 
studies to evaluate individual attitudes towards political and economic issues. The ISSP distinguishes between East 
and West Germany and Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews. We aggregated these data to the country level. We exclude 
Taiwan, as income data is unavailable from the World Development indices. We also exclude Venezuela from the 
analysis, as the country has been going through a substantial reduction (with some short-term increases) in the 
amount of FDI it receives since President Hugo Chavez took office in 1999.  For instance, FDI fell from 3.7 billion 
dollars in 2001 to 800 million dollars in 2001 (IHT 2008).  Many observers also point out that the country is a lot 
less welcoming to FDI than official rhetoric (until recently) would lead one to believe.   
56 The European countries included are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.     14
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Table 1 also provides information on the extent of the outward and inward stock of 
foreign direct investment, as a proportion of GDP in 2002.
57  The table indicates that the average 
outward and inward FDI as a proportion of GDP differs substantially across the three samples in 
2002.  While on average net stocks from developed countries is negative, net stocks for both 
CEECs and other emerging markets exceed 15 per cent.  Strikingly, the data on FDI stocks for 
each country reveal gross differences in the rate of FDI expansion between 1992-2002 across the 
three sub-samples. Here, FDI expansion is measured as FDI inflows (2002, in millions of US 
dollars) as a proportion of stocks (1992).  While the average FDI expansion rate is approximately 
three- and four-fold, respectively, for developed countries and emerging markets, for CEECs, the 
same rate is approximately 22.6, owing to the rapid transition from command to market 
economies in the region.  As we will discuss below, this stark change of events in CEECs likely 
plays into individual attitudes towards MNE impact on local businesses.  Moreover, the table 
illustrates the extent to which countries and regional groupings are pro-MNE: in the developed 
sub-sample, almost 18 percent of the respondents look favorably upon MNEs, in the CEECs the 
same number is about 14 percent and in the heterogeneous group of other emerging markets (the 
developing countries in our sample) it is about 19 percent. Descriptive statistics, however, 
conceal information about the distribution of observations and are unable to control other 
variables, such as differences in demographic and socio-economic variables, which likely 
influence perceptions of how MNEs impact local firms.  Hence a more complete analysis of the 
data is required.  
We now turn to testing the hypotheses – we test them in the order necessary for the 
integrity of the data analysis and not in the order in which we introduced them through the 
literature analysis above.  Hence, we first test hypothesis 4, which posited that the economic 
development of the country of residence would affect individual perceptions of how MNEs 
impact local businesses.  To do so, we introduce CEEC and emerging country dummies to a 
base-line specification that is estimated using binary probit models with pro-MNE as the 
                                                            
57 The FDI data comes from UNCTAD and the World Development Indicators.     15
dependent variable.
58  We also incorporate demographic factors, specifically age and gender, the 
log of real income, and the level of education (broken into three variables), and a set of country 
dummies. Definitions of variables and regionally grouped summary statistics for the full set of 
variables are included in Appendices I and II. Throughout the paper, for ease of interpretation, 
we report the findings as marginal effects – the change in probability of being pro-MNE, as 
defined here, to an infinitesimal change in the continuous regressor (or a unit increase in the 
dichotomous regressor), holding all other variables at their sample means. 
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Table 2, which uses developed nations as the reference group, demonstrates that being 
from either a CEEC or an emerging economy significantly reduces the individual perception that 
MNEs are not harmful to local firms.  The differing magnitude of the country grouping on the 
dependent variable suggests that those in CEEC nations are more pessimistic about the effects of 
MNEs on local firms.
59 This finding provides robust statistical evidence that there are substantial 
differences between the groups of nations (hypothesis 4) and thus examining the data in three 
sub-samples of country groupings is likely to yield a richer analysis of individual attitudes 
towards the impact of MNEs on local businesses.   
The results in Table 2 also suggest that men are less likely to consider that MNEs are 
harming local businesses, as are those who are younger and are better-off economically 
(determined by the log real income variable). The specification also illustrates that more highly 
educated individuals, particularly those who are COLLEGE educated, look more favorably upon 
the influence of MNEs on local businesses.  The literature on spillovers surveyed above suggests 
that MNEs drive up the demand for skilled employees.  Therefore, it is no surprise to find, in 
support of hypothesis 2, that the more skilled individuals (i.e. those that are more educated) are 
                                                            
58 The results are insensitive to the use of the ordered probit estimation where the dependent variable is coded as 1, if 
individual’s ‘disagree’; 2, if they ‘strongly disagree’; 3, for those who ‘neither agree or disagree’; 4, for those who 
‘agree’; and 5 for ‘agree strongly’ to the question “Large international companies are doing more and more damage 
to local businesses.”   
59 The careful reader will have noted that the descriptive statistics suggest that individuals in CEECs on average 
consider that big business has a less positive impact on local business than developed countries while other 
emerging countries have, on average, a slightly more positive view of how big business impacts local business. 
However, controlling for individual characteristics, both groups of less developed nations are relatively more 
sceptical about the benefits of big business.   16
more prone to be pro-MNE, as defined.  At the same time, given the particular importance of 
education, it is plausible that it is the pro-outsider, cosmopolitan values that higher education 
instils in individuals that affect their attitudes towards MNEs.
60 Certainly, a richer and more 
nuanced examination of the economic winners and losers is required in order to tease out 
individual perceptions of MNE impact on host economy firms.  
 
Economic Determinants of Individual Attitudes 
The ISSP data does not provide information about whether or not individuals work for MNEs.  
Thus we are unable to directly address whether those individuals working for MNEs, namely the 
individuals who are likely to benefit most directly from MNEs, consider to the impact of MNEs 
on local businesses to be harmful.  Fortunately, since employment in MNEs likely constitutes 
quite a small proportion of our sample of individuals, it is highly improbable that the findings of 
this study could be greatly influenced by the attitudes of MNE employees.
61   
Moreover, we are able to assess which individuals do not work for MNEs, given that the 
ISSP data contains detailed information on the individual’s sector and type of occupation based 
on ISCO classifications.
62  Hence we are able to test inferences regarding whether individuals 
working in different sectors/occupations, differ in their views of how MNEs impact local firms.  
We are able to differentiate individuals into three sectors of employment:  PUBLIC, PRIVATE, 
and SELF-EMPLOYED.  Regarding individuals’ type of occupation, given sample size 
considerations, we utilize the aggregate groupings to construct a set of occupational dummies.  
These groupings consist of SENIOR employees, which typically encompasses legislators, senior 
officials and managers, corporate managers, and other managers; PROFESSIONALs; 
                                                            
60 Education’s effects of socializing individuals to think in certain ways is argued in empirical analyses by 
Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 405 contains a review of the literature that argues 
for the value-forming effects of education.   
61 Although the ISSP dataset does not provide us with information regarding the number of individuals employed by 
MNEs, we are nevertheless able to provide an estimate of the proportion of employees working for MNEs in 
eighteen of the countries in our sample.  These eighteen countries are:  thirteen developed countries (Austria, 
Britain, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
USA) and five less developed countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, the Philippines, Poland, and Slovenia). We 
estimate the proportion of employees working for MNEs in these countries as follows.  We combine UNCTAD data 
on the number of MNE employees in a particular country with the total number of individuals of working age (ages 
15-65) in that country based on the World Development Indicators dataset. Then, we estimate the proportion of 
these working age individuals employed in the private sector using the randomly sampled ISSP data. Based on these 
calculations, we are able to confirm that the proportion of MNE employees is quite low, making up 2.4% of the 
economically active, which makes up 3.9% of the private sector population (an average of 6.3% in the developed 
country sample and 3.0% in the less developed country samples). 
62 The classifications come from ILO ISCO 1988 main occupational group classifications.   17
TECHNICAL/ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALs; CLERICAL employees; SERVICE employees; 
CRAFT workers; SKILLED AGRICULTURAL workers, individuals working in the 
ELEMENTARY sector; PLANT workers and those who are economically INACTIVE. 
Based on the earlier discussion on spillovers, we can posit the following general 
statements regarding how type/sector of occupation affects individual attitudes towards MNEs’ 
impact local businesses.  First, those employees in highly skilled occupations should be the 
greatest benefactors from the presence of MNEs (hypothesis 2). This grouping of employees 
generally includes those who are SENIORs but also potentially PROFESSIONALs and 
TECHNICAL/ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALs.
63 Second, individuals who work in the 
PRIVATE sector and are SELF-EMPLOYED have disputably the most to gain and most to lose 
from the presence of MNEs.  As the above discussions revealed, these individuals either benefit 
from the presence of MNEs through their own firms or through client firms that do business with 
MNEs, or they are pressured by the competitive presence of MNEs and are economically harmed 
(hypothesis 3). While we are not able to identify whether individuals working in the PRIVATE 
sector are employed by MNEs or local firms, we are able to identify individuals who are not 
involved in the private sector—PUBLIC sector and SOE employees. There is no obvious reason 
why PUBLIC sector employees would gain individually (hypothesis 1), so using the PUBLIC 
sector as a reference group enables us to determine whether or not PRIVATE sector employees 
or the SELF-EMPLOYED look favourably upon the impact of MNEs on local businesses. 
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Table 3 extends the baseline specification to incorporate a set of sector and occupational 
dummies taking those variables for which we are plausibly able to make predictions— the highly 
skilled SENIOR category and those working in the PRIVATE sector—as reference groups. The 
full sample results provide support for the hypotheses outlined above. Those employees that 
constitute the SENIOR  category are less likely to consider MNEs as harmful to the local 
                                                            
63 Using occupational effects in conjunction with educational outcomes, particularly for professions where there is a 
direct mapping between COLLEGE education and occupational choice, can be objected on the grounds that the two 
variables are inter-related. However, our results show that the correlation between COLLEGE qualification and 
PROFESSIONALs is 0.45, and the correlation between COLLEGE qualification and SENIOR employees is 0.10, 
suggesting the presence of dynamics other than a simple overlap between college education and choice of 
occupation.     18
businesses, while CRAFT employees are most concerned with MNEs’ harmful effects on local 
firms relative to those in the SENIOR category.  Furthermore, sentiment in the PRIVATE sector, 
which is composed of employees who constitute the bulk of the employment in local businesses, 
is less negatively inclined toward the impact of MNEs compared to GOVERNMENT.  The same 
observation can be made about the SELF-EMPLOYED.  Also, the significant impact of INCOME 
and EDUCATION withstand the inclusion of sector/type of occupation variables.   
These results from the full sample are more robustly displayed in the developed country 
sub-sample.  In that sample, the highly significant results obtained across types and sectors of 
occupation (with the exception of SOEs) demonstrates clearly that relative to the highly skilled 
SENIOR reference group, all occupational groups seem more likely to consider MNEs to be 
harmful to local business, with skilled manual workers (CRAFT) more inclined than the rest to 
consider MNEs as harmful.
64  The findings for CEECs generally mimic the results from the 
developed country sample with some differences. Although education again significantly 
influences individuals’ perceptions, individuals with COLLEGE  education are about half as 
inclined as their counterparts in the developed world to be pro-MNE.  At the lowest education 
level captured, SECONDARY INCOMPLETE, individuals are about twice as likely as their 
counterparts in developed countries to consider MNEs’ impact on local businesses to be harmful. 
Also, results for SELF-EMPLOYED individuals lose their significance in the CEEC sub-sample. 
The findings for the set of emerging economies are a lot less robust. The lack of precision in the 
findings undoubtedly reflects the heterogeneous nature of the sample, which contains five 
countries from three continents. While the sector and occupational dummies lack robust 
explanatory power, the results indicate that INCOME has a robust but slightly lower marginal 
impact on the dependent variable compared to the other sub-samples.  COLLEGE education’s 





64 The capital intensive production technology combined with low skilled plant labour, synonymous with MNEs, has 
been seen as a primary cause for displacement of skilled blue collar workers in manufacturing in developed 
countries by unskilled plant workers (e.g. Garrahan, 1992). 
65 As noted earlier, we do not directly assess whether individuals also consider the effect of MNEs on the economy 
as a whole in forming their opinions regarding whether MNEs affect local businesses adversely. Nevertheless, we 
experimented with a question that could plausibly illuminate about this issue:  “How proud are you of [Country] in 
the following?  [Country's] economic achievements”.  We did not obtain a robust statistical relationships between 
answers to this questions and the dependent variable.    19
Non-economic determinants of individual attitudes 
In Table 4, we add the variables that examine the non-economic determinants of individuals’ 
attitudes towards the dependent variable to the specifications.  We examine two variables 
capturing patriotic and nationalist tendencies (hypothesis 5).  NATPRIDE1, asks individuals 
whether “[the individual] would rather be a citizen of [Country] than any other country in the 
world.” The variable is coded 1 for “Strongly Agree” or “Agree” and 0 for “Strongly Disagree”, 
“Disagree” or “Neither Agree or Disagree”. NATPRIDE2 supplies information regarding how 
individuals perceive their country in relation to other countries based on the following question: 
“Generally speaking, [Country] is better than most other countries.” and is coded analogously to 
NATPRIDE1.  Patriotism and nationalism can be differentiated by the extent to which the 
individual is proud of one’s nation (patriotism) versus the extent to which the individual sees her 
country as superior to other countries (nationalism).
66  In this regard, NATPRIDE1 is more 
inclined to capture patriotism; where as, NATPRIDE2 is more likely to capture nationalism.  
Both of these variables increase individual propensity to think that MNEs are harming local 
businesses in both developed countries and CEECs.  The variables are insignificant for the 
emerging country sub-sample.   
In addition, we examine the extent to which democracy, seen as a component of “political 
trust”, affects pro-MNE (hypothesis 6).
67  Specifically, we examine the answers to the following 
question:  “How proud are you of [Country] in the following way? The way democracy works” 
(the variable is coded analogously to the nationalism/patriotism variables).  This question is 
particularly pertinent for developed countries with advanced democracies.  The results provide 
some support for this point:  in developed countries, pride in the way in which democracy works 
increases individual propensity to think that the MNEs are not harming local businesses. 
We also analyze two additional variables that shed light on how individuals’ attitudes 
towards international relations affect their attitudes towards MNEs’ impact on the local firms 
(hypothesis 7).  INTERESTS variable is based on: “[Country] should follow its own interests, 
even if that leads to conflicts with other nations.” It is coded the same way as the three variables 
above.  Mayda and Rodrik interpret this variable, which they use in their study of individual 
                                                            
66 On this point see Druckman 1994, 46; Hoffman 1998, 200-1.  In both accounts, nationalism is considered to 
embody more negative and exclusionary attitudes towards other nations than patriotism.   
67 Citrin 1974.   20
attitudes towards trade, as the application of a “nationalistic stand to a practical situation.”
68 We 
interpret this question slightly differently in the sense that it likely reflects attitudes that conform 
to a realist perspective on international affairs given the emphasis in the question on the notion of 
‘interests’.
69  Individuals who answer the INTERESTS question affirmatively could interpret 
MNEs as infringements on national autonomy of states (which could be seen as an extension of a 
nationalism, or, as in our interpretation, simply as a view of inter-state affairs).  Our results show 
that this variable is significant and exerts a negative impact on the dependent variable.  Across 
the three types of economies examined, those that answer affirmatively to the INTERESTS 
question have the propensity to think that MNEs harm local businesses.   
The  INTERNATIONAL ACTION variable allows us to relate the information on how 
individuals conceive international institutions to their sentiment on MNEs’ influence on local 
firms:  “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? For certain problems, 
like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions.” It 
is coded 1 if “Strongly Disagree” or “Disagree”, 0 if “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, “Neither Agree 
or Disagree”.  We consider this variable to indicate an inclination for multilateral governance 
and thus positive feelings regarding the prospects for international cooperation.  Hence 
INTERESTS and INTERNATIONAL ACTION variables are expected to act in opposite 
directions.  Results confirm this expectation.  INTERNATIONAL ACTION exerts a significant 
and positive impact on the dependent variable both in developed and emerging economies, while 
it is insignificant in CEECs.  In developed and emerging economies, thinking that international 
institutions should govern on certain issues increases individual propensity to think that MNEs 
are not harming local businesses.  Overall, these two variables show that attitudes towards 
international relations impact upon individual attitudes towards MNEs (hypothesis 7).  This is a 
finding that is expected in that sense that MNEs are influential actors in contemporary global 
politics.   
With the addition of non-economic factors to previous specifications, as Table 4 
demonstrates, education loses its significance in CEECs, while only COLLEGE education 
                                                            
68 Mayda and Rodrik 2005. 
69 Despite debates over what exactly constitutes national interest, the emphasis on interest and national interest is 
critical to various realist approaches (e.g. see Waltz 1979; Carr 1939).     21
retains significance in other emerging economies.  INCOME retains its significant impact across 
the board, as do sector/type of occupation classifications.
70  
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Extension I: Interpretations of ‘Economic’ Variables 
In an important contribution, Hainmueller and Hiscox provide evidence, in the context of trade, 
that education should not be viewed purely as a measure of skill.
71 They argue that the impact of 
education has more to do with ideas and information than education being a proxy for skill-level 
and hence an indicator of the individual’s labor market expectations.
72 Given the lack of 
scholarly consensus concerning the precise impact of MNEs on local businesses, it is hard to 
extend these authors’ argument from the realm of trade to the issue of FDI and argue that with 
greater knowledge, college educated individuals will be more pro-FDI and hence pro-MNE.   
Nonetheless, it is possible to examine their wider thesis that education is not merely about skill-
acquisition, but that it also imparts certain cultural and ideological elements on to individuals. 
  In order to explore the cultural and ideological elements of education, following 
Hainmueller and Hiscox, we estimate the model using retired individuals.  However, for these 
retired individuals, we also include their last (prior to retirement) sector of employment and type 
of occupation as explanatory variables.  Our rationale is that it is difficult to conceive that 
individuals radically alter their attitudes upon retiring. Indeed there is a considerable sociological 
literature that illustrates how institutions of employment and careers mould individuals’ 
perspectives.
73 Hence earlier work on individual attitudes towards globalization may be picking 
up, to some extent at least, the habitual behaviours and preferences of individuals formed during 
                                                            
70 In addition, to confirm the robustness of the findings, we examine a variety of specifications that exclude some 
individual countries based on their level of restrictions to FDI. It is possible that variation in government restrictions 
to FDI influence individual attitudes towards MNEs, since studies have shown that FDI restrictions can affect the 
extent of investment in a country (see, e.g., Nicolletti et al. 2003). Alternatively, restrictions may themselves reflect 
public attitudes via voter impact on governmental policies.  Golub (2008) finds that the Philippines had substantially 
higher barriers to FDI in services in 2004-5. Earlier work showed that Canada exhibited the highest level of FDI 
protection amongst the OECD countries in 1983-2000 (Golub 2003), and Russia also remains more protected 
compared to other countries in our samples (Koyama and Golub 2006). Given that the Philippines, Canada, and 
Russia exhibit relatively higher levels of FDI restriction, we re-estimated each of the specifications included in this 
paper by excluding these countries.  Our key findings were robust to the exclusion of these countries from the 
samples. 
71 Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006.
 
72 Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 2001b. 
73 A classic reference is Grey 1994.   22
labor market tenure, rather than a higher degree of awareness provided by college education. 
Since the ISSP dataset contains information on individuals’ occupations prior to retirement, we 
are able to operationalize this hypothesis. 
  Table 5 provides the results for retired individuals using the rich final specification 
incorporating economic and non-economic factors applied in Table 4. Examining the full sample, 
the findings provide vindication for the Hainmueller and Hiscox thesis within the confines of this 
paper: the education variable remains robustly positive and exhibits a relatively greater impact 
on the dependent variable than in previous regressions (the coefficient on COLLEGE, for 
example, shifts from 0.086 for the full sample to 0.124 for retired individuals). There is also 
support for the hypothesis that occupational memory influences perceptions as a number of the 
occupational dummies continue to influence individuals’ perceptions even after retirement. 
Moreover, PUBLIC employees remain significantly less enchanted with the prompt that MNEs 
are not harming local business. Overall, despite the different composition of the retired sample, a 
number of propositions related to the impact of sector/type of occupation on the dependent 
variable remain consistent across specifications.  
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Extensions II: Forms of FDI 
Theoretical and empirical work reviewed argued that different forms of FDI influence local 
businesses in potentially quite different ways. As discussed above, the distinction regarding the 
type of FDI is highlighted in the literature on technological spillovers with an emphasis on the 
notion that M&As are more likely to tap into existing linkages among local firms.  In this regard, 
M&A investments promise relatively greater spillovers to domestic firms, and hence M&As are 
potentially more beneficial for the local economy.  Furthermore, if the foreign company was 
previously exporting to the country but has now acquired a local company through M&A, then 
domestic competition is reduced.  This kind of an effect through M&A is undesirable when 
viewed from the perspective of competition, but desirable viewed from the perspective of local 
business owners or local spectators.  Also, if the M&A transfers technology to the acquired 
domestic firm from the parent firm, then MNEs affect local businesses positively.  Given the 
suggested differences over the impact of M&A versus Greenfield, we analyze the extent to   23
which these differences influence individual perceptions of MNEs’ impact on local firms.  To do 
so, using country-level data from UNCTAD, we derived variables to capture the relative extent 
of inward M&A (in billions) and Greenfield investments (number of sites) as a proportion of 
total inward FDI.
74   
Although the specific literature reviewed in this paper suggests that the extent of M&A 
investments, relative to extent of Greenfield investment, should lead to individuals being more 
likely to consider the MNEs’ impact on local firms in positive light, from the perspective of 
individuals, the story could be different. First, Greenfield investment adds new capacity to the 
economy, whereas M&A indicates a change of ownership.  Thus, from an economic perspective, 
individuals may perceive the impact of Greenfield investments to be more positive, as they 
observe the building of new infrastructure and the creation of new jobs given the creation of 
business from scratch.  Moreover, M&A often leads to restructuring and layoffs 
(“rationalization”), especially in developed countries where labor costs are higher, whereas 
Greenfield leads to visible job creation through labor recruitment.
75 Also, we indicated above 
that if the company was previously exporting to the country, M&A can reduce competition in the 
domestic economy.  Yet, foreign firms may be more directly competing with local firms through 
buying out local firms rather than relying on their own branding through export.
76  Moreover, 
Heyman et al provide evidence, in the context of Sweden only, that Greenfields tend to pay 
higher wage premium than M&A. While the extent to which this finding is generalizable remains 
unclear, it provides yet another rationale for the individual to consider Greenfield more desirable 
than M&A.
77  Finally, from an emotional perspective too, M&A versus Greenfield are likely to 
have divergent influences on individual propensity to think positively of MNEs. While the 
former could simply be regarded as de-nationalization of local business, the latter could lead to 
perceptions of co-existence of local and international business.   
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74 For an analysis of which mode of entry, M&A or Greenfield, that firms and governments of host countries prefer, 
see, for instance, Mattoo et al. 2001.  
75 Sauvant 2008, 10. 
76 See, e.g., Meyer and Tran 2006. Looking at the market entry strategies of Carlsburg Breweries in four emerging 
markets, they illustrate that the firm uses what they term two-tier branding and acquisition strategies, where the firm 
sells it premium brand but purchases local companies to sell to the mass market.  
77 Heyman et al 2007.   24
Given the various potential differences between the two investment forms, using identical 
specification to Table 4, we run a series of estimations that include variables capturing M&A and 
GREENFIELD that are summarized in Table 6.  The full set of estimates are in Appendix B. Since 
the units differ between the two variables, the variables are transformed into log form to allow 
direct comparisons of the variables’ impact on the dependent variable. For the full sample, the 
greater the relative M&A expenditure, the more likely it is that people consider MNEs to be 
harming local businesses. Comparing across columns illustrates that it is the preferences of those 
living in developed economies that drive this result. The magnitude of the effect in developed 
nations, as well as being oppositely signed, is larger than in the other country groupings. 





Even though MNEs and FDI are critical components of globalization in the eyes of voters, there 
exists scant systematic work on individual attitudes towards MNEs. In this paper, we studied the 
variation in individual attitudes towards MNEs in various developed and developing countries, 
distinguishing between CEECs and other emerging markets.  We analyzed how these attitudes 
are determined by a rich set of economic and non-economic factors. To highlight some key 
findings, as expected from the economic literature, high-skilled individuals working as senior-
level managers, legislators, and officials are more inclined to think MNEs do not negatively 
impact local businesses, so are individuals who are economically better-off and well educated. 
Moreover, the paper illuminates aspects of individual attitudes that cannot be anticipated from 
this literature given the somewhat equivocal conclusions this literature provides.  For instance, 
employees of the private sector are less prone to think MNEs are adversely impacting local 
businesses than employees of the public sector.  In general, the paper provides a rich picture of 
how occupation type/sector affects individual attitudes towards the impact of MNEs on local 
business.  The results also demonstrate that men and the relatively young are less likely to think 
that MNEs are damaging local businesses.  Additionally, a number of differences across country 
groupings exist.  Particularly, in CEECs various groups tend to be relatively more sceptical about 
MNEs, with education not playing a robust role once non-economic factors are introduced into   25
the specifications.  Furthermore, the paper provides evidence that a retired individual’s last 
sector/type of occupation has a lingering effect on the person’s perspective on MNEs’ impact.  
Finally, the paper shows that type of FDI (M&A versus Greenfield investment) influences 
individual attitudes towards the impact of MNEs on local businesses.  In the developed world, 
M&A affects individual opinions negatively, whereas in less developed countries are more 
positive. In contrast, Greenfield investments are perceived as being beneficial across developed 
and developing countries.  Future studies could build upon this paper to examine other aspects of 
the issue of how voters perceive MNEs’ influence on local firms.  For instance, future work 
could explore how public or official relations with prominent MNEs affect individual attitudes in 
specific countries.  It would be interesting to see how elite rhetoric and policy orientation 
towards MNEs play into individual attitudes.  While the issue of how MNEs impact local firms 
is pivotal, other dimensions of the voter opinion on MNEs could be considered.  Addressing 
these other issues awaits the availability of rich, well-specified survey data.  Given the enhanced 
levels of scepticism about globalization, further research on understanding the determinants of 
anti-globalization views, as well as contemplating the right set of mechanisms to provide an 
outlet for these views, seem pressing priorities for research and policy. 
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Table 1: Foreign direct investment and MNE sentiment (in percentage terms) 
Country Outward Inward Net Flow Growth* Pro ‐MNE Country Outward Inward Net Flow Growth* Pro ‐MNE
Australia (AU) 27.1 41.1 14 1.9 6.1 Bulgaria (BG) 0.7 26.4 25.7 19.4 28.4
Austria (AT) 23.3 21.6 ‐1.7 3.6 15.5 Czech Republic (CZ) 1.5 42.6 41.1 13.4 12.9
Canada (CA) 37.1 30.5 ‐6.6 2.1 13.4 Hungary (HU) 4.2 43.1 38.9 10.6 7.2
Denmark (DK) 28.3 29.8 1.5 5.8 29.6 Latvia (LV) 3.4 29.5 26.1 15.6 11.4
Finland (FI) 43.5 30.1 ‐13.4 9.2 19.4 Poland (PL) 0.6 21.7 21.1 35.3 10.8
France (FR) 41.1 29.1 ‐12 3.0 8.0 Russia (RU) 4.9 7.2 2.3 998.4 14.9
Germany (DE) 30.8 12.9 ‐17.9 2.5 21.8 Slovak Republic (SK) 2 25.6 23.6 8.9 8.8
United Kingdom (UK) 64.8 36.3 ‐28.5 3.0 7.9 Slovenia (SI) 4.4 15.5 11.1 10.1 20.9
Ireland (IE) 52.9 126.3 73.4 4.5 37.4 AVERAGE (CEEC) 2.7 26.5 23.7 22.6 14.4
Israel (IL) 7.5 18.6 11.1 5.4 26.8
Japan (JP) 7.9 2.1 ‐20.2 5.0 26.6 Chile (CL) 20.2 69.7 49.5 3.7 13.2
Netherlands (NL) 94.4 74.2 ‐20.2 4.7 24.0 Philippines (PH) 2.1 17.1 15.0 3.0 23.0
New Zealand (NZ) 9.7 46.8 37.1 2.4 16.3 South Africa (ZA) 16.1 29 12.9 2.8 27.2
Norway (NO) 28.8 20.4 ‐8.4 1.8 20.7 South Korea (KR) 5.4 7.4 2.0 6.6 22.5
Portugal (PT) 24.8 35.4 10.6 3.0 9.0 Uruguay (UY) 1.4 21.8 20.4 2.0 10.2
Spain (ES) 29.5 25.8 ‐3.7 2.4 9.3 AVERAGE (Emerging) 9.0 29.0 20.0 4.3 19.2
Sweden (SE) 47 58.9 11.9 8.5 19.3
Switzerland (CH) 109.8 50.6 ‐59.2 3.8 22.9
United States (US) 17.2 12.6 ‐4.6 3.1 14.4
AVERAGE 38.2 37.0 ‐1.9 3.1 18.3 AVERAGE (non‐DC) 5.9 27.7 18.5 13.5 16.8
 
Source: Outward and inward investment stocks as a proportion of GDP (UNCTAD); Proportion of Pro-MNE (ISSP). 
Note: * ‘Growth’ refers to the growth of FDI between 1992 and 2002. Outward and inward investment stocks as a proportion of GDP relate to 2002 or the closest 
available year.   31
Table 2. Base line model 
Dependent variable: Pro‐MNE Coeff z‐stat
Age AGE -0.001 (4.70)
Sex MALE 0.041 (8.66)
Income log(Real income) 0.033 (9.59)
Education SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 0.019 (2.72)
(Ref. Uneducated) HIGH SCHOOL 0.062 (6.88)
COLLEGE 0.111 (11.63)
Grouping Central and Eastern Europe -0.120 (6.27)







Notes: For  probit estimations, coefficients are estimated marginal effects ( k x F ∂ ∂ / ), i.e., the marginal effect of 
Pr(y = 1) given a unit increase in the value of the relevant dichotomous regressor ( k x ∂ ) holding all other regressors 
at their sample means. The discrete change in probability is reported for binary regressors. z-statistics are reported 
and are derived using robust standard errors.  
 
Table 3: Economic factors 
(i) (ii)    (iii) (iv)
Dependent variable: Pro‐MNE Full        Developed     Central & Eastern            Emerging
       Sample         Countries            Europe            Economies
Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat
Age AGE -0.001 (2.06) -0.001 (2.77) -0.001 (2.14) 0.001 (1.17)
Sex MALE 0.038 (6.32) 0.049 (6.61) 0.026 (5.55) 0.026 (1.52)
Income log(Real Income) 0.032 (6.07) 0.034 (5.74) 0.039 (4.38) 0.021 (2.69)
Education SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 0.019 (2.48) 0.020 (2.67) 0.041 (3.43) 0.007 (0.51)
(Ref. Uneducated) HIGH SCHOOL 0.063 (5.02) 0.068 (4.17) 0.051 (2.76) 0.056 (2.42)
COLLEGE 0.119 (9.03) 0.119 (7.50) 0.066 (3.44) 0.110 (3.30)
Occupation PROF -0.009 (0.77) -0.048 (4.14) -0.040 (2.22) -0.003 (0.15)
(Ref. Senior) TECH/ASSOC PROF 0.006 (0.58) -0.046 (4.13) -0.044 (3.31) 0.059 (1.84)
CLERK 0.005 (0.54) -0.029 (2.68) -0.051 (3.98) -0.012 (0.34)
SERVICE -0.009 (0.82) -0.057 (4.06) -0.061 (3.59) 0.031 (1.13)
CRAFT -0.046 (2.90) -0.093 (6.24) -0.054 (2.49) -0.016 (0.26)
SKILLED AGRI 0.022 (1.87) -0.018 (1.09) -0.034 (2.09) 0.011 (0.37)
PLANT -0.014 (1.52) -0.064 (6.88) -0.056 (3.64) 0.022 (1.18)
ELEMENTARY -0.016 (1.20) -0.075 (6.02) -0.068 (3.64) 0.022 (0.53)
INACTIVE -0.063 (4.68) -0.069 (5.85) -0.056 (2.43) -0.010 (0.16)
Sector SOE 0.005 (0.40) 0.016 (0.78) -0.003 (0.21) 0.011 (0.61)
(Ref. Public) PRIVATE 0.032 (4.37) 0.034 (3.43) 0.029 (4.84) 0.022 (1.32)
SELF EMPLOYED 0.049 (5.58) 0.052 (4.60) 0.007 (0.76) 0.014 (0.95)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES
No. obs 31,501 17,150 6,698 7,653
Log pseudolikelihood -13,813 -7,260 -2,493 ‐3944
Pseudo R
2
0.086 0.095 0.072 0.074
 
Notes: See Table 1.    32
Table 4. Economic and Non-Economic factors 
(i) (ii)    (iii) (iv)
Dependent variable: Pro‐MNE Full        Developed     Central & Eastern            Emerging
       Sample         Countries            Europe            Economies
Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat
Age AGE 0.000 (1.40) -0.001 (1.90) -0.001 (0.80) 0.001 (1.11)
Sex MALE 0.043 (6.97) 0.048 (6.17) 0.031 (3.45) 0.038 (2.09)
Income log(Real Income) 0.030 (5.59) 0.037 (5.95) 0.036 (3.96) 0.016 (1.53)
Education SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 0.011 (1.37) 0.017 (2.26) 0.008 (0.50) -0.005 (0.46)
(Ref. Uneducated) HIGH SCHOOL 0.046 (4.31) 0.063 (4.25) 0.015 (0.74) 0.044 (2.02)
COLLEGE 0.086 (7.46) 0.104 (7.46) 0.025 (1.15) 0.095 (2.75)
Nationalist NATPRIDE1 -0.046 (5.51) -0.050 (4.91) -0.064 (4.99) -0.001 (0.20)
NATPRIDE2 -0.019 (2.91) -0.017 (2.19) -0.037 (3.57) -0.013 (1.02)
Institutional INTERESTS -0.042 (5.09) -0.027 (2.75) -0.056 (3.07) -0.063 (3.61)
INTERNATIONAL ACTION 0.086 (4.49) 0.105 (4.79) 0.051 (1.30) 0.026 (0.50)
Democracy DEMOCR 0.012 (1.40) 0.019 (1.94) 0.023 (1.27) -0.022 (1.33)
Occupation PROF -0.049 (4.46) -0.052 (4.12) -0.053 (2.15) -0.006 (0.20)
(Ref. Senior) TECH/ASSOC PROF -0.036 (3.35) -0.044 (3.96) -0.045 (1.92) 0.042 (1.08)
CLERK -0.041 (4.12) -0.032 (2.77) -0.057 (3.58) -0.026 (0.62)
SERVICE -0.049 (4.13) -0.052 (3.59) -0.060 (2.74) 0.014 (0.43)
SKILLED AGRI -0.028 (2.03) -0.017 (0.95) -0.053 (2.25) 0.004 (0.10)
CRAFT -0.075 (7.72) -0.077 (8.94) -0.079 (3.96) -0.016 (0.30)
PLANT -0.066 (6.84) -0.075 (6.96) -0.063 (2.84) 0.000 (0.02)
ELEMENTARY -0.058 (3.29) -0.075 (4.72) -0.069 (2.00) 0.024 (0.44)
INACTIVE -0.071 (4.24) -0.090 (5.93) -0.049 (2.05) -0.008 (0.12)
Sector SOE 0.010 (0.72) 0.016 (0.70) -0.003 (0.24) 0.025 (1.18)
(Ref. Public) PRIVATE 0.035 (4.26) 0.036 (3.33) 0.024 (2.55) 0.025 (1.14)
SELF EMPLOYED 0.042 (4.26) 0.053 (4.08) 0.004 (0.36) 0.016 (0.88)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES
No. obs 26,674 15,160 5,460 5,979
Log pseudolikelihood -11,597 -6,495 -1,998 -3,020
Pseudo R
2 0.099 0.103 0.097 0.087
 





Table 5. Retired individuals 
(i) (ii)    (iii) (iv)
Dependent variable: Pro‐MNE Full        Developed     Central & Eastern            Emerging
       Sample         Countries            Europe            Economies
Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat
Age AGE -0.001 (1.71) -0.002 (2.54) 0.000 (0.14) -0.002 (0.45)
Sex MALE 0.042 (3.46) 0.060 (5.27) 0.005 (0.16) 0.039 (0.93)
Income log(Real Income) 0.030 (3.12) 0.027 (2.06) 0.029 (1.55) 0.022 (1.05)
Education SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 0.040 (3.53) 0.030 (2.00) 0.025 (2.32) 0.165 (2.73)
(Ref. Uneducated) HIGH SCHOOL 0.074 (3.93) 0.081 (3.17) 0.058 (1.79) 0.083 (1.52)
COLLEGE 0.127 (4.46) 0.143 (4.28) 0.089 (1.69) 0.186 (1.34)
Nationalist NATPRIDE1 -0.064 (4.67) -0.060 (3.30) -0.074 (3.91) -0.030 (2.19)
NATPRIDE2 -0.009 (0.81) -0.022 (1.69) -0.009 (0.39) 0.042 (1.68)
Institutional INTERESTS -0.040 (3.17) -0.030 (2.23) -0.044 (1.66) -0.077 (4.49)
INTERNATIONAL ACTION 0.105 (3.64) 0.145 (3.94) -0.020 (0.37) 0.083 (1.80)
Democracy DEMOCR 0.006 (0.44) -0.011 (0.66) 0.048 (2.00) -0.026 (1.44)
Occupation PROF -0.051 (2.42) -0.050 (1.80) -0.032 (1.24) -0.015 (0.20)
(Ref. Senior) TECH/ASSOC PROF 0.002 (0.07) -0.004 (0.14) 0.025 (0.04) 0.175 (2.68)
CLERK 0.007 (0.32) 0.008 (0.27) 0.044 (0.21) -0.004 (0.07)
SERVICE -0.003 (0.14) -0.031 (1.37) 0.044 (0.23) 0.138 (2.75)
CRAFT -0.034 (2.38) -0.042 (2.33) 0.007 (0.71) -0.031 (0.89)
PLANT -0.035 (1.43) -0.063 (2.27) 0.023 (0.13) -0.010 (0.22)
ELEMENTARY -0.014 (0.64) -0.048 (2.20) 0.056 (0.45) -0.024 (0.53)
Sector SOE -0.002 (0.05) 0.018 (0.50) -0.002 (0.48) -0.046 (0.76)
(Ref. Public) PRIVATE 0.033 (1.93) 0.051 (3.01) 0.005 (2.01) 0.034 (0.47)
SELF EMPLOYED 0.038 (1.61) 0.051 (1.65) 0.048 (0.61) 0.016 (0.34)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES
No. obs 4,914 2,908 1,483 523
Log pseudolikelihood -1,598 -1,067 -445 -230
Pseudo R
2 0.130 0.157 0.122 0.079  
Notes: See Table 1. 
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Table 6. Merger and Acquisition vs. Greenfield based Foreign Direct Investment 
(i) (ii)    (iii) (iv)
Dependent variable: Pro‐MNE Full        Developed     Central & Eastern           Emerging
       Sample         Countries            Europe            Economies
Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat
M&A  -0.004 (12.35) -0.045 (10.92) 0.051 (10.92) 0.059 (2.82)
Log pseudolikelihood -11597 -6459 -1998 -2303
Pseudo R
2 0.099 0.104 0.097 0.047
N 26,674    15,235                 5,450       4,922            
GREENFIELD 0.007 (9.24) 0.005 (6.67) 0.002 (8.54) 0.017 (5.09)
Log pseudolikelihood -11597 -6459 -1998 -3020
Pseudo R
2 0.088 0.104 0.097 0.087
N 26,674    15,235                 5,450       4,922            
 
Note: Results are summary estimates from eight separate regressions - four with M&A incorporated into the analysis 
and four with Greenfield investment – which, other than the inclusion of these investment variables, employ a 
specification that is identical to the one in Table 4. The full set of results are provided in Appendix B.  M&A is 
measured as the total national inward M&A (in billions) divided by the extent of FDI. The quotient is then taken as a 
proportion of GDP.  
 
Sources: Cross-Border M&A database and Inward FDI to GDP ratios come from UNCTAD Country Profiles (US 
dollars at current prices for both sources). Data on the number of Greenfield sites was taken from the World 
Investment Report (2005). 
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Appendix I. Variables descriptions 
Variables Coding ISSP
promne Pro‐MNE Large international companies are more damage to local businesses v41
Age AGE From 18 years of age. age
Sex MALE Gender; coded 1 if male, and 0 if female. sex



























Sector PUBLIC Currently employed in the public sector. wrktype*
of employment PRIVATE Currently employed in the private sector. wrktype
SELF EMPLOYED Currently self employed. wrktype








INACTIVE Not employed    36
Table A.II Summary Statistics 
Full Sample No Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max Developed  No Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Pro‐MNEs 41,160 0.19 0.39 0 1 Pro‐MNEs 21,255 0.17 0.38 0 1
Age AGE 45,195 46.15 17.13 18 98 Age AGE 23,249 48.29 16.90 18 98
Sex MALE 45,502 0.46 0.50 0 1 Sex MALE 23,445 0.47 0.50 0 1
Income log(Real income) 35,882 7.32 2.31 ‐1.14 12.82 Income log(Real income) 19,270 8.40 2.21 ‐0.02 12.82
Education SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 45,502 0.43 0.49 0 1 Education SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 23,445 0.37 0.48 0 1
(Ref. Uneducated) HIGH SCHOOL 45,502 0.16 0.37 0 1 (Ref. Uneducated) HIGH SCHOOL 23,445 0.18 0.39 0 1
COLLEGE 45,502 0.15 0.36 0 1 COLLEGE 23,445 0.17 0.37 0 1
Nationalist NATPRIDE1 44,160 0.75 0.43 0 3 Nationalist NATPRIDE1 22,682 0.74 0.44 0 1
NATPRIDE2 43,286 0.54 0.50 0 5 NATPRIDE2 22,410 0.58 0.49 0 1
Institutional ENVIRON 42,639 0.52 0.50 0 5 Institutional ENVIRON 22,084 0.49 0.50 0 1
INTERNATIONAL ACTION 40,045 0.03 0.16 0 5 INTERNATIONAL ACTION 21,860 0.03 0.18 0 1
Democracy DEMOCR 42,121 0.54 0.50 0 5 Democracy DEMOCR 21,685 0.69 0.46 0 1
Occupation SENIOR 44,478 0.07 0.26 0 1 Occupation SENIOR 23,197 0.09 0.29 0 1
PROFESSIONALS 44,478 0.12 0.32 0 1 PROFESSIONALS 23,197 0.13 0.34 0 1
TECHNICIANS/ASSOC PROF 44,478 0.12 0.32 0 1 TECHNICIANS/ASSOC PROF 23,197 0.13 0.34 0 1
CLERKS 44,478 0.09 0.29 0 1 CLERKS 23,197 0.11 0.31 0 1
SERVICE WORKERS 44,478 0.11 0.31 0 1 SERVICE WORKERS 23,197 0.12 0.32 0 1
SKILL AGRI 44,478 0.03 0.17 0 1 SKILL AGRI 23,197 0.03 0.16 0 1
CRAFT 44,478 0.11 0.31 0 1 CRAFT 23,197 0.10 0.30 0 1
PLANT 44,478 0.06 0.24 0 1 PLANT 23,197 0.06 0.23 0 1
ELEMENTARY 44,161 0.09 0.29 0 1 ELEMENTARY 23,197 0.06 0.25 0 1
INACTIVE 44,478 0.20 0.40 0 1 INACTIVE 23,003 0.16 0.37 0 1
Sector PUBLIC 44,767 0.17 0.38 0 1 Sector PUBLIC 23,197 0.19 0.39 0 1
PUBLIC ‐ SOE 44,767 0.08 0.28 0 1 PUBLIC ‐ SOE 23,151 0.06 0.25 0 1
PRIVATE 44,767 0.40 0.49 0 1 PRIVATE 23,151 0.48 0.50 0 1
SELF EMPLOYED 44,767 0.11 0.32 0 1 SELF EMPLOYED 23,151 0.12 0.32 0 1
Form of Investment M&A 45502 5.76 1.88 ‐0.61 9.79 Form of Investment M&A 23,151 6.57 1.58 4.19 9.79




Central and Eastern Europe No Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max Emerging No Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Pro‐MNEs 9,069 0.14 0.35 0 1 Pro‐MNEs 10,836 0.17 0.38 0 1
Age AGE 10,093 46.07 17.49 18 97 Age AGE 11,853 48.29 16.90 18 97
Sex MALE 10,171 0.42 0.49 0 1 Sex MALE 11,886 0.47 0.50 0 1
Income log(Real income) 8,220 6.55 0.78 2.03 10.01 Income log(Real income) 8,392 8.40 2.21 ‐1.14 9.73
Education SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 10,171 0.55 0.50 0 1 Education SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 11,886 0.37 0.48 0 1
(Ref. Uneducated) HIGH SCHOOL 10,171 0.16 0.36 0 1 (Ref. Uneducated) HIGH SCHOOL 11,886 0.18 0.39 0 1
COLLEGE 10,171 0.13 0.33 0 1 COLLEGE 11,886 0.17 0.37 0 1
Nationalist NATPRIDE1 9,783 0.72 0.45 0 1 Nationalist NATPRIDE1 11,695 0.74 0.44 0 1
NATPRIDE2 9,383 0.35 0.48 0 1 NATPRIDE2 11,493 0.58 0.49 0 1
Institutional ENVIRON 9,332 0.51 0.50 0 1 Institutional ENVIRON 11,223 0.49 0.50 0 1
INTERNATIONAL ACTION 9,195 0.02 0.13 0 1 INTERNATIONAL ACTION 8,990 0.03 0.18 0 1
Democracy DEMOCR 9,218 0.24 0.42 0 1 Democracy DEMOCR 11,218 0.69 0.46 0 1
Occupation SENIOR 9,465 0.05 0.22 0 1 Occupation SENIOR 11,816 0.04 0.20 0 1
PROFESSIONALS 9,465 0.13 0.33 0 1 PROFESSIONALS 11,816 0.08 0.27 0 1
TECHNICIANS/ASSOC PROF 9,465 0.14 0.34 0 1 TECHNICIANS/ASSOC PROF 11,816 0.08 0.27 0 1
CLERKS 9,465 0.07 0.26 0 1 CLERKS 11,816 0.07 0.25 0 1
SERVICE WORKERS 9,465 0.11 0.31 0 1 SERVICE WORKERS 11,816 0.09 0.28 0 1
SKILL AGRI 9,465 0.03 0.17 0 1 SKILL AGRI 11,816 0.04 0.19 0 1
CRAFT 9,465 0.17 0.38 0 1 CRAFT 11,816 0.07 0.25 0 1
PLANT 9,465 0.09 0.28 0 1 PLANT 11,816 0.05 0.22 0 1
ELEMENTARY 9,465 0.10 0.31 0 1 ELEMENTARY 11,816 0.14 0.35 0 1
INACTIVE 9,465 0.11 0.31 0 1 INACTIVE 11,816 0.34 0.47 0 1
Sector PUBLIC 9,830 0.25 0.43 0 1 Sector PUBLIC 11,786 0.06 0.24 0 1
PUBLIC ‐ SOE 9,830 0.19 0.40 0 1 PUBLIC ‐ SOE 11,786 0.03 0.17 0 1
PRIVATE 9,830 0.32 0.47 0 1 PRIVATE 11,786 0.29 0.46 0 1
SELF EMPLOYED 44,767 0.06 0.25 0 1 SELF EMPLOYED 23,151 0.16 0.36 0 1
Form of Investment M&A 10171 4.97 2.15 ‐0.61 7.51 Form of Investment M&A 11,886 6.57 1.58 1.77 7.60




Appendix B.I. Impact of Merger and Acquisition based Foreign Direct Investment 
(i) (ii)    (iii) (iv)
Dependent variable: Pro‐MNE Full        Developed     Central & Eastern           Emerging
       Sample         Countries            Europe            Economies
Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat
FDI form M&A  -0.004 (12.35) -0.004 (10.92) 0.005 (10.92) -0.008 (2.82)
Age AGE 0.000 (1.40) -0.001 (1.90) -0.001 (0.87) 0.001 (1.11)
Sex MALE 0.043 (6.97) 0.048 (6.17) 0.031 (3.40) 0.038 (2.09)
Income log(Real Income) 0.030 (5.59) 0.037 (5.95) 0.036 (4.51) 0.016 (1.53)
(Ref. Uneducated) SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 0.011 (1.37) 0.017 (2.26) 0.008 (0.43) -0.005 (0.46)
HIGH SCHOOL 0.046 (4.31) 0.063 (4.25) 0.015 (0.73) 0.044 (2.02)
COLLEGE 0.086 (7.46) 0.104 (7.46) 0.025 (1.09) 0.095 (2.75)
Nationalist NATPRIDE1 -0.046 (5.51) -0.050 (4.91) -0.064 (5.03) -0.001 (0.20)
NATPRIDE2 -0.019 (2.91) -0.017 (2.19) -0.037 (3.52) -0.013 (1.02)
Democracy DEMOCR -0.042 (5.09) -0.027 (2.75) -0.056 (3.07) -0.063 (3.61)
Institutional INTERESTS 0.086 (4.49) 0.105 (4.79) 0.051 (1.30) 0.026 (0.50)
INTERNATIONAL ACTION 0.012 (1.40) 0.019 (1.94) 0.023 (1.29) -0.022 (1.33)
Occupation PROF -0.049 (4.46) -0.052 (4.12) -0.053 (2.12) -0.006 (0.20)
(Ref. Senior) TECH/ASSOC PROF -0.036 (3.35) -0.044 (3.96) -0.045 (1.91) 0.042 (1.08)
CLERK -0.041 (4.12) -0.032 (2.77) -0.057 (3.55) -0.026 (0.62)
SERVICE -0.049 (4.13) -0.052 (3.59) -0.060 (2.76) 0.014 (0.43)
SKILLED AGRI -0.028 (2.03) -0.017 (0.95) -0.053 (3.07) 0.004 (0.10)
CRAFT -0.075 (7.72) -0.077 (8.94) -0.079 (4.03) -0.016 (0.30)
PLANT -0.066 (6.84) -0.075 (6.96) -0.063 (2.93) 0.000 (0.02)
ELEMENTARY -0.058 (3.29) -0.075 (4.72) -0.069 (2.05) 0.024 (0.44)
INACTIVE -0.071 (4.24) -0.090 (5.93) -0.049 (2.03) -0.008 (0.12)
Sector SOE 0.010 (0.72) 0.016 (0.70) -0.003 -(0.24) 0.025 (1.18)
(Ref. Self employ) PRIVATE 0.035 (4.26) 0.036 (3.33) 0.024 (2.55) 0.025 (1.14)
SELF EMPLOYED 0.042 (4.26) 0.053 (4.08) 0.004 (0.36) 0.016 (0.88)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES
No. obs 26,674 15,235 5,450 4,922
Log pseudolikelihood -11,597 -6,459 -1,998 -2,303
Pseudo R
2 0.099 0.104 0.097 0.047
 
Note: M&A is measured as the total national inward M&A (in billions) divided by the extent of FDI. The quotient is 
then taken as a proportion of GDP. Sources: Cross-Border M&A database and Inward FDI to GDP ratios come 
UNCTAD Country Profiles (US dollars at current prices for both sources).   40
Appendix B.II. Impact of Greenfield based Foreign Direct Investment 
(i) (ii)    (iii) (iv)
Dependent variable: Pro‐MNE Full        Developed     Central & Eastern            Emerging
       Sample         Countries            Europe            Economies
Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat Coeff z‐stat
FDI form GREENFIELD 0.007 (9.24) 0.005 (6.67) 0.002 (8.54) 0.017 (5.09)
Age AGE 0.000 (1.40) -0.001 (1.90) -0.001 (0.80) 0.001 (2.23)
Sex MALE 0.043 (6.97) 0.048 (6.17) 0.031 (3.45) 0.044 (2.41)
Income log(Real Income) 0.030 (5.59) 0.037 (5.95) 0.036 (3.96) 0.023 (2.58)
(Ref. Uneducated) SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 0.011 (1.37) 0.017 (2.26) 0.008 (0.50) 0.002 (0.11)
HIGH SCHOOL 0.046 (4.31) 0.063 (4.25) 0.015 (0.74) 0.041 (1.49)
COLLEGE 0.086 (7.46) 0.104 (7.46) 0.025 (1.15) 0.079 (2.21)
Nationalist NATPRIDE1 -0.046 (5.51) -0.050 (4.91) -0.064 (4.99) -0.001 (0.10)
NATPRIDE2 -0.019 (2.91) -0.017 (2.19) -0.037 (3.57) -0.012 (0.91)
Democracy DEMOCR -0.042 (5.09) -0.027 (2.75) -0.056 (3.07) -0.046 (3.47)
Institutional INTERESTS 0.086 (4.49) 0.105 (4.79) 0.051 (1.30) 0.068 (3.06)
INTERNATIONAL ACTION 0.012 (1.40) 0.019 (1.94) 0.023 (1.27) -0.006 (0.55)
Occupation PROF -0.049 (4.46) -0.052 (4.12) -0.053 (2.15) 0.010 (0.42)
(Ref. Senior) TECH/ASSOC PROF -0.036 (3.35) -0.044 (3.96) -0.045 (1.92) 0.064 (1.90)
CLERK -0.041 (4.12) -0.032 (2.77) -0.057 (3.58) -0.007 (0.17)
SERVICE -0.049 (4.13) -0.052 (3.59) -0.060 (2.74) 0.026 (0.89)
SKILLED AGRI -0.028 (2.03) -0.017 (0.95) -0.053 (2.25) -0.005 (0.13)
CRAFT -0.075 (7.72) -0.077 (8.94) -0.079 (3.96) -0.007 (0.13)
PLANT -0.066 (6.84) -0.075 (6.96) -0.063 (2.84) 0.011 (0.47)
ELEMENTARY -0.058 (3.29) -0.075 (4.72) -0.069 (2.00) 0.046 (0.85)
INACTIVE -0.071 (4.24) -0.090 (5.93) -0.049 (2.05) -0.005 (0.08)
Sector SOE 0.010 (0.72) 0.016 (0.70) -0.003 (0.24) 0.025 (1.18)
(Ref. Self employ) PRIVATE 0.035 (4.26) 0.036 (3.33) 0.024 (2.55) 0.025 (1.14)
SELF EMPLOYED 0.042 (4.26) 0.053 (4.08) 0.004 (0.36) 0.016 (0.88)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES
No. obs 26,674 15,160 5,450 5,979
Log pseudolikelihood -11,597 -6,459 -1,998 -3,020
Pseudo R
2 0.088 0.104 0.097 0.087
 
Note: Data on the number of Greenfield sites was taken from the World Investment Report (2005). 